Cheap Wars by Nitzan, Jonathan & Bichler, Shimshon
Jonathan Nitzan and Shimshon Bichler
Th e Economy of the Occupation
A Socioeconomic Bulletin
№ 10 * September 2006
Cheap Wars
Jonathan Nitzan and Shimshon Bichler
Economy of the Occupation
Socioeconomic Bulletin № 10___________________________________________
Cheap Wars
___________________________________________
September 2006
Published by the Alternative Information Center (AIC)
http://www.alternativenews.org/
Graphic Designer: Tal Hever
Printer: Latin Patriarchate Printing Press
Cover: British soldiers marching to the Battle of the Somme (1916)
Th e AIC wishes to acknowledge the generous support for its activities by:
Th e Basque Government through the help of PTM-mundubat, Diputacion de Guipuz-
koa, the Irish Government through the Christian Aid, Associazione Comunita Papa 
Giovanni XXIII, CCFD, Dan Church Aid, Diakonia, ICCO and Broederlijk Delen.
Beit Sahour
Building 111 Main Street
PO Box 201
Beit Sahour, Palestine
Phone: 972-(0)2-277-5444
Fax: 972-(0)2-277-5445
Jerusalem
4 Queen Shlomzion Street 
PO Box 31417
Jerusalem, Israel 91313
Phone: 972-(0)2-624-1159; 624-1424
Fax: 972-(0)2-625-3151
Table of Contents:
___________________________________________
1.) Capitalism and War 4
2.) Th e Rise and Demise of Military Keynesianism 5
3.) Th e Globalization of Ownership 8
4.) Th e New Wars 10
5.) Th e New Order of Capital 12
6.) Energy Conﬂ icts and Diﬀ erential Proﬁ ts 15
7.) Th e Primacy of Prices 19
8.) Sweet Inﬂ ation 22
9.) Cheap Wars 25
Endnotes 30
Tank
Economy of the Occupation4 |
The recent flurry of wars—from Afghanistan and Iraq to Gaza and Leba-
non—has revived talk of Imperialism, 
Military Keynesianism and the Mili-
tary-Industrial Complex. Capitalism, 
many radicals have long argued, needs 
war. It needs it in order to expand its 
geographical reach; it needs it in order 
to open up new markets; it needs it in 
order to gain access to cheap raw ma-
terials; and it needs it to placate op-
position at home and pacify rebellious 
populations abroad.1
Th e common perception is that 
war serves to boost the economy. Ac-
cording to this 
argument, mili-
tary conﬂ ict—
and high military 
spending in prep-
aration for such 
conflict—gener-
ates overall growth and helps reduce 
unemployment. Th is feature of mili-
tary spending turns it into an eﬀ ec-
tive ﬁ scal tool. In years of slack, the 
government can embark on Military 
Keynesianism, increase its spending 
on weapons and pull the economy out 
of recession. 
Over the longer haul, military ex-
penditures are said to undermine 
the peaceful, civilian outlook of lib-
eral regimes. Spending on the military 
boosts the business interests of the 
large armament corporations, hard-
ens the outlook of the security ap-
paratus and emboldens the top army 
brass. Together, these groups become 
increasingly fused in an invisible, yet 
powerful, Military-Industrial Com-
plex—a complex that gradually comes 
to dominates policy and pushes so-
ciety toward foreign aggression and 
military adventurism.
1. Capitalism and War
Th e common 
perception is 
that war serves 
to boost the 
economy 
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Theories of Military Keynesianism and the Military-Industrial Com-
plex became popular after the Second 
World War, and perhaps for a good 
reason. Th e prospect of military de-
mobilization, particularly in the Unit-
ed States, seemed alarming. Th e U.S. 
elite remembered vividly how soar-
ing military spending had pulled the 
world out of the Great Depression, 
and it feared that falling military bud-
gets would reverse this process. If that 
were to happen, the expectation was 
that business would tumble, unem-
ployment would soar, and the legiti-
macy of free-market capitalism would 
again be called into question. 
Seeking to avert this prospect, 
in 1950 the U.S. National Security 
Council drafted a top-secret docu-
ment, NSC-68. Th e document, which 
was declassiﬁ ed only in 1977, explic-
itly called on the government to use 
higher military 
spending as a 
way of prevent-
ing such an out-
come.2 
N S C - 6 8 
marked the 
birth of Mili-
tary Keynesianism. In the decades 
that followed, military expenditures 
seem to have worked as the docu-
ment envisaged. Th e basic process is 
illustrated in Figure . Th e graph 
shows the relationship between U.S. 
economic growth and the country’s 
military spending. Th e thin line plots 
the annual rate of economic growth 
against the right scale. Th e thick line 
shows the level of military spending, 
expressed as a share of GDP and plot-
ted against the logarithmic left scale.3 
Both series are smoothed as 10-year 
moving averages to emphasize their 
long term tendencies. 
2. Th e Rise and Demise of Military Keynesianism
Military 
demobilization 
seemed alarming 
after the Second 
World War 
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Th e data show a co-movement of 
the two series, particularly since the 
1930s. Th e rise in military spending 
in preparation for the Second World 
War coincided with a massive eco-
nomic boom. Military spending had 
risen to 43 percent of GDP by 1944 
and averaged 20 percent of GDP dur-
ing the 1940s. Th is rise was accompa-
nied by soaring economic growth, with 
annual rates peaking at 18 percent in 
1942 and averaging 6 percent during 
1. U.S. Military Spending and Economic Growth
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the 1940s (the peak levels of the early 
1940s cannot be seen in the chart due 
to the smoothing of the series). 
After the war, military spending be-
gan to trend downward, but remained 
at very high levels for the next couple 
of decades. Th e adoption of Military 
Keynesianism, along with the wars 
in Korea and Vietnam, helped keep 
military expenditures at 12 percent 
of GDP during the 1950s and at 10 
percent during the 1960s. Economic 
growth during this period averaged 
over 4 percent—lower than in the 
Second World War, but rapid enough 
to sustain the buoyancy of American 
capitalism and the conﬁ dence of its 
capitalists.
Both big business and organized 
labor supported this set up. Th e large 
corporate groups saw military spend-
ing as an acceptable and even desir-
able form of government intervention. 
At the aggregate level, these expendi-
tures helped counteract the threat of 
recession at home and oﬀ set the loss 
of civilian markets to European and 
Japanese competitors—yet without 
undermining the sanctity of private 
ownership and free enterprise. At the 
disaggregate level, many large ﬁ rms 
received lucrative contracts from the 
Pentagon, handouts that even the 
staunchest free marketers found dif-
ﬁ cult to refuse. 
Th e large unions endorsed Military 
Keynesianism for diﬀ erent reasons. 
Th ey agreed to stay out of domestic 
politics and international relations, to 
accept high military expenditures, and 
to minimize strikes in order to keep 
the industrial peace. In return, they 
received job security, high wages and 
the promise of ever-rising standards 
of living. 
Th e consensus was aptly sum-
marized in 1971 by President Nix-
on, who pronounced that ‘we are all 
Keynesians now.’ 
But that was the peak. By the early 
1970s, the Keynesian Coalition of big 
business and organized labor started 
to unravel, 
M i l i t a r y 
Ke ynes ian-
ism began to 
wither and 
the welfare-
warfare state 
commenced 
its long de-
cline. 
Military spending 
was seen as a 
desirable form 
of government 
intervention by 
large corporations
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Underlying the rise and demise of Military Keynesianism was an 
epochal reversal in the spatial nature 
of ownership—a U-turn from gradual 
de-globalization in the ﬁ rst half of the 
century to massive globalization in the 
second half. 
Until the 1950s, the ownership of 
capital, in the United States and else-
where, was retreating into its national 
cocoons. Th e statistical footprints of 
the process are clear. In 1900, the ratio 
of foreign-held assets to world GDP 
reached a peak of 19 percent. But 
the subsequent turmoil of two world 
wars, depression, import substitution 
and capital 
c o n t r o l s 
have taken 
a heavy toll. 
F o r e i g n 
ownership 
ties were 
broken or 
frozen, and 
the ratio 
of foreign-held assets to world GDP 
fell continuously, reaching a mere 6 
percent in 1960. At the trough of the 
process, the accumulation of capital 
was conducted largely within national 
boundaries. 
Th is decline ended in the early 
1970s. Capital again broke through 
its national envelope, and as neolib-
eralism and deregulation gained mo-
mentum foreign ownership started to 
rise. Th e ratio of foreign-held assets 
to world GDP increased exponen-
tially, doubling every decade: it rose 
to 25 percent in 1980, climbed to 50 
percent in 1990, and reached over 90 
percent by 2000.4 
Th e eﬀ ect on proﬁ t of this reversal 
has been dramatic. U.S.-based ﬁ rms 
now receive roughly one third of their 
earnings from their foreign subsidiar-
ies, up from 5 percent in the 1950s—a 
six-fold increase.
Th is reversal in the global pattern 
of ownership fundamentally altered 
the power structure and institutions 
of capitalism. With capital bought 
3. Th e Globalization of Ownership
Capitalists were 
no longer fearful 
of recession. On 
the contrary, 
they often 
encouraged it 
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and sold on a world scale and proﬁ ts 
increasingly earned outside the coun-
try, capital accumulation became less 
and less reliant on domestic sales. 
With less emphasis on local activ-
ity, Keynesian policies grew out of 
fashion. And with Keynesianism on 
the decline, the business-labor accord 
started to unravel. 
Th e welfare state, previously seen 
as a bulwark against communism, be-
came a burden. Labor was no longer 
likely to revolt—particularly with jobs 
being shipped to ‘emerging markets’ 
and with union membership on the 
decline. Furthermore, capitalists were 
no longer fearful of recession. On the 
contrary, they often encouraged it as a 
means of disciplining workers, reduc-
ing wages and reversing the hard-won 
social gains of working people. 
Th e warfare state was also com-
ing under pressure. Th e turning point 
was the collapse of Soviet Bloc. With 
only one superpower remaining, large 
military budgets were now diﬃ  cult to 
justify. In the 1990s, military spend-
ing around the world took a nose dive, 
falling by as much as a third from 
their all time peak in the late 1980s. 
As Figure  shows, expenditures on 
armaments in the United States, the 
world’s largest spender, dropped to an 
average of 4.5 percent of GDP in the 
ﬁ rst half of the 2000s, down from 7 
percent in the 1980s. 
Anti-Aircraft Missile
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The demise of thewel fare - war fare  s t a te opened the door for the 
new rhetoric of neoliberalism. Propo-
nents of free markets hailed the new 
regime for its peaceful tendencies. Its 
detractors agreed—but only partly. 
On the one hand, they concurred that 
neoliberalism, in its quest to secure 
free trade and open capital ﬂ ow, tries 
to establish political stability and in-
ternational peace. On the other hand, 
they faulted neoliberalism for its in-
visible violence, inﬂ icted through hy-
per exploitation, mass poverty, rising 
inequality, economic uncertainty and 
human insecurity. 
Both the adherents and the crit-
ics, therefore, were surprised by the 
sudden bel-
licosity of the 
early twenty-
ﬁ rst century. 
Old theories 
of imperial-
ism and mili-
tarism were 
quickly dusted oﬀ  and tucked onto 
neoliberalism. Instead of productivity 
miracles and No Logo, analysts start-
ed to talk about ‘new imperialism’ and 
‘neoliberal wars.’
For the most part, though, these 
hybrid theories are misleading. Th e 
new conﬂ icts of the twenty-ﬁ rst cen-
tury—the ‘inﬁ nite wars,’ the ‘clashes of 
civilization,’ the ‘new crusades’—are 
fundamentally diﬀ erent from the ‘mass 
wars’ and military conﬂ icts between 
states that characterized capitalism 
from the nineteenth century until the 
end of the Cold War. Th e main dif-
ference lies not so much in the mili-
tary nature of the conﬂ icts, as in the 
broader role that war plays in capital-
ism. 
To begin with, in a world open for 
business there is no need to physically 
conquer new territory—not for raw 
materials and not for additional mar-
kets (note that Iraqi oil production 
has nearly ceased since its conquest 
in 2003, while its market for foreign 
imports, negligible to begin with, has 
4. Th e New Wars
Th e new conﬂ icts 
demonstrate the 
broader role that 
war plays in 
capitalism
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contracted). 
Th e same goes for military spend-
ing: with the share of foreign proﬁ ts 
soaring, there is no longer a business 
imperative for high military expen-
ditures. While U.S. military budgets 
have risen somewhat in the wake of 
the new wars—from 3.9 percent of 
GDP at the end of Clinton’s presiden-
cy to 4.7 percent presently—this is 
an increase whose eﬀ ect on aggregate 
demand is insigniﬁ cant by historical 
standards. 
Th e U.S. attacks of the 2000s also 
make little military sense. Countries 
with proven nuclear capabilities, such 
as Pakistan and North Korea, have 
been left alone, while others that pre-
sented no real danger—speciﬁ cally Af-
ghanistan and Iraq—were invaded, oc-
cupied and now tie down much of the 
U.S. standing 
army, with no 
end in sight. 
F i n a l l y, 
the televised 
war footing 
and constant 
talk about 
t e r r o r i s m 
may have 
f r i g h t e n e d 
the western population. But unlike 
the success of nationalist-liberal ide-
ologies during the two world wars and 
the Cold War that followed, the new 
rhetoric of inﬁ nite war hasn’t made 
the masses fall for neoliberal capital-
ism.
Th e wars of the 2000s are indeed 
new. And they are new, at least in part, 
because capitalism itself has changed. 
Countries with 
nuclear capabilities 
have been left 
alone, while others 
that presented no 
real danger were 
invaded
Katiusha
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The central changeconcerns the underlying nature of capital, a trans-
formation that began in the late nine-
teenth century but became evident 
only recently. 
Existing theories, anchored in the 
reality of the early nineteenth century, 
continue to examine capital from the 
‘material’ perspective of consumption 
and production. Neoclassical econo-
mists anchor their analysis in utility, 
while classical Marxists base it on labor 
time. In contrast to these approaches, 
we suggest that, under modern condi-
tions, capital can no longer be viewed 
as a ‘material’ entity. As we see it, 
capital repre-
sents neither 
neoclassical 
utility nor 
Marxist ab-
stract labor, 
but rather 
power—the 
power of its 
owners to 
shape the process of social reproduc-
tion as a whole. 
Based on a power understanding of 
capital, we argue, ﬁ rst, that the analy-
sis of capitalism should focus not on 
capital ‘in general’ and many capitals 
‘in competition,’ but speciﬁ cally on the 
dominant capital groups at the centre 
of the political economy. Second, we 
claim that accumulation should be 
understood not absolutely, but diﬀ eren-
tially—that is, in reference to the abil-
ity of dominant capital to ‘beat the av-
erage’ and increase its relative power.5
Th e implications of this power 
perspective are far reaching. For our 
purpose here, they suggest: 
1. Th at over time, corporate 
mergers, rather than economic growth, 
become the main engine of diﬀ erential 
accumulation (‘breadth’); and
2. Th at under certain circum-
stances, dominant capital can beneﬁ t 
greatly from inﬂ ation and stagﬂ ation 
(‘depth’).
5. Th e New Order of Capital
Capital 
represents neither 
neoclassical utility 
nor Marxist 
abstract labor—
but power 
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In our research we found that, over 
the past century, global accumulation 
indeed oscillated between these two 
regimes of merger and stagﬂ ation. 
Th e most recent phase, which lasted 
through much of the late 1980s and 
1990s, was clearly one of breadth. In 
that period, dominant capital beneﬁ t-
ed greatly from the opening up to cor-
porate takeover of the former Soviet 
Union and other ‘emerging markets,’ as 
well as from the collapse of the welfare 
state and the massive privatization of 
government services. 
Th is breadth cycle, with its em-
phasis on neoliberalism, deregulation, 
sound ﬁ nance and disinﬂ ation, came to 
a close at the turn of the new millen-
nium. Th e ﬁ nancial crisis that began 
in Asia and later spread to the core 
markets, the crumbling of the ‘new 
economy’ and its scandalous account-
ing practices, and talk of global terror-
ism and the inﬁ nite war to defeat it, 
have together made capital movement 
look less tempting and mergers far less 
promising. Furthermore, two decades 
of neoliberalism have weakened pric-
ing power, raising the specter of price 
and debt deﬂ ation for the ﬁ rst time 
since the Great Depression.
Faced with 
these predica-
ments, capital-
ists generally 
and dominant 
capitalists par-
ticularly began 
yearning for a 
little dose of 
‘healthy’ inﬂ a-
tion both to avert debt deﬂ ation and 
to kick-start diﬀ erential accumula-
tion. As it turned out, the solution for 
their predicament—intended or oth-
erwise—was a new ‘Energy Conﬂ ict’ 
in the Middle East (that is, a conﬂ ict 
related directly or indirectly to oil). 
Over the past thirty-ﬁ ve years, these 
conﬂ icts have been the prime mover of 
oil prices, and oil prices have provided 
the spark for broad-based inﬂ ation. It 
was a turnkey mechanism for trigger-
ing inﬂ ation, and it was ready to use. 
In this sense, military conﬂ ict has 
come to assume a new, roundabout 
role in the accumulation process. Until 
the 1950s and 1960s, the main impact 
of military conﬂ ict worked through 
large military budgets which directly 
boosted aggregate demand and overall 
proﬁ ts, as well as the income of the 
Th e most recent 
phase of breadth 
accumulation 
came to a close 
at the turn of the 
new millennium
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leading military contractors. But with 
the re-globalization of ownership 
and the on-set-
ting of détente, 
military bud-
gets started to 
contract. Ini-
tially, they fell 
relatively, as a 
share of GDP, 
but since the 
late 1980s, they 
also began to drop absolutely, in con-
stant dollar terms. Although these 
expenditures still nourish the military 
contractors, their direct eﬀ ect on capi-
tal accumulation has diminished sig-
niﬁ cantly. 
However, military conﬂ ict as such 
hasn’t lost its appeal; it still has a big 
impact on accumulation. Th e novelty 
is that the impact now works mostly 
indirectly, through inﬂ ation, relative 
prices and redistribution. 
Military 
conﬂ ict now 
has an indirect 
impact, through 
inﬂ ation and 
redistribution
Fighter Plane
Cheap Wars | 15
The key beneficiaries of this new, indirect link are the large oil companies. 
Th e geographic centre of this process 
is the Middle East. After the Vietnam 
War, the Middle East has become the 
hot spot of global conﬂ ict, with obvi-
ous corollaries for the price of oil. Th e 
relationship between these conﬂ icts 
and the diﬀ erential proﬁ ts of the oil 
companies, however, has received little 
or no attention. 
Th e reason for this neglect is not 
diﬃ  cult to see. Most analyses of Mid-
dle-East conﬂ ict and oil are situated 
in the disciplinary intersection of ‘in-
ternational relations’ and ‘international 
economics.’ Th eir basic reasoning boils 
down to a struggle among states over 
raw materials. On the one hand, there 
are the industrialized countries that 
need cheap oil in order to sustain their 
growth and expanded reproduction. 
On the other hand there are the coun-
tries of the Middle East, organized 
through OPEC, whose intention is 
to extract from the process as much 
rent as they can. 
Th is broad con-
ﬂ ict is compli-
cated by various 
factors: for ex-
ample, inter-state 
rivalry—say be-
tween the United 
States and the 
Soviet Union 
(previously) and 
Europe and Asia 
(presently); reli-
gious and ethnic 
hostilities in the Middle East itself; 
or the interests of various sectors and 
capitalist fractions in the industrial-
ized countries. 
In this polemic of high politics and 
resource economics, few have both-
ered to break through the aggregate 
front, fewer have done empirical work, 
and almost no one has dealt with the 
question of how exactly accumulation 
by the oil companies ﬁ ts into the pic-
ture. Figure  oﬀ ers a glimpse into 
what is missing from the story. Th e 
6. Energy Conﬂ icts and Diﬀ erential Proﬁ ts
Analyses of 
Middle-East 
conﬂ ict and 
oil are usually 
situated in 
the ﬁ elds of 
‘international 
relations’ and 
‘international 
economics’
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2. Leading Oil Companies: Differential Profits
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chart shows the history of diﬀ erential 
accumulation by the ‘Petro-Core’ of 
leading oil companies—speciﬁ cally: 
BP, Chevron, Exxon, Mobil, Royal-
Dutch/Shell and Texaco.6 
Each bar in the ﬁ gure measures the 
diﬀ erence between the rate of return 
on equity of these companies and the 
average rate of return on equity of the 
Fortune 500 benchmark (with the 
result expressed as a percent of the 
Fortune 500 average). Th e grey bars 
show years of diﬀ erential accumula-
tion; that is, years in which the leading 
oil companies beat the average with a 
higher rate of return. Th e black bars 
show periods of diﬀ erential decumu-
lation; that is, years in which the lead-
ing oil companies trailed the average. 
For reasons that will become apparent 
in a moment, these latter periods sig-
nal ‘danger’ in the Middle East. Finally, 
the explosion signs show ‘Energy Con-
ﬂ icts’—namely, conﬂ icts that were re-
lated, directly or indirectly, to oil.7 Th e 
ﬁ gure exhibits three related patterns, 
all remarkable in their persistence: 
* First, every energy conﬂ ict in 
the Middle East was preceded by a 
danger zone, in which the oil compa-
nies suﬀ ered diﬀ erential decumula-
tion.
* Second, every energy conﬂ ict 
was followed by a period during which 
the oil companies beat the average.
* And, third, with only one ex-
ception in 1996-7, the oil companies 
never managed to beat the average 
without an Energy Conﬂ ict ﬁ rst tak-
ing place.8
Furthermore, this pattern ﬁ ts into 
the larger processes of breadth and 
depth. Th e ﬁ gure 
points to three dis-
tinct periods, each 
characterized by a 
diﬀ erent regime of 
diﬀ erential accumu-
lation, and each led 
by a diﬀ erent fac-
tion within domi-
nant capital.
During the depth 
era of the 1970s and 
early 1980s, diﬀ er-
ential accumulation 
Every energy 
conﬂ ict in 
the Middle 
East was 
preceded by 
a time when 
oil companies 
suﬀ ered from 
diﬀ erential 
decumulation
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was fuelled by 
stagﬂ ation and 
driven by conﬂ ict. 
Th e leading fac-
tion within dom-
inant capital was 
the Weapondol-
lar-Petrodollar 
Coalition of large 
armament and oil 
ﬁ rms. In this con-
text, the oil com-
panies managed 
to beat the aver-
age comfortably, with only occasional 
setbacks which were quickly corrected 
by Middle East conﬂ icts. 
During the breadth period of the 
late 1980s and 1990s, merger replaced 
inﬂ ation as the main engine of dif-
ferential accumulation. Th e oil and 
armament companies lost their pri-
macy to a ‘new economy’ coalition led 
by civilian high-tech companies. Neo-
liberal rhetoric replaced the lingo of 
welfare-warfare state, conﬂ icts in the 
Middle East grew fewer and farther 
between, and the oil companies com-
monly trailed the average. 
Events over the past few years sug-
gest that this second period may have 
come to an end, with the ebbing of the 
merger boom and the return to prima-
cy of the Weaponodollar-Petrodollar 
Coalition. Th e latter coalition, whose 
fortunes had dwindled since the stag-
ﬂ ationary bonanza of the 1970s and 
early 1980s, has come back with a 
vengeance. Having helped re-install 
the Bush family in the White House, 
the coalition started looking for new 
enemies and was only too happy to 
exploit the opportunity oﬀ ered by the 
‘new Pearl Harbor’ of September 11.9
Th e argument and statistical pat-
terns presented here were ﬁ rst articu-
lated in the late 1980s, further de-
veloped in the mid-1990s, and most 
recently updated in 2006.10 However, 
the last few observations in Figure  
are new, and they suggest a quantitative 
departure from past patterns. Until the 
late 1990s, the diﬀ erential performance 
of the oil companies oscillated between 
50 percent above or below the For-
tune 500. Recently, though, the scale 
changed. During the period of 2000-
2005, the world’s four leading oil com-
panies earned US $338 billion in net 
proﬁ t—one third of a trillion—repre-
senting an average rate of return of 20 
percent, nearly twice the Fortune 500’s. 
After re-
installing the 
Bush family 
in the White 
House, the 
Weaponodollar-
Petrodollar 
Coalition 
started looking 
for new enemies
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The link that connects Middle-East conﬂ icts and differential profitability 
is the price of oil. Th is link is illus-
trated in Figure . Th e thick line in 
the chart shows the percent share of 
all listed oil companies in global cor-
porate proﬁ t. Th e thin line shows the 
7. Th e Primacy of Prices
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‘relative’ price of 
crude oil, com-
puted by divid-
ing the dollar 
price per barrel 
by the U.S. con-
sumer price in-
dex, and lagged 
one year (report-
ed corporate earnings represent the 
moving sum of the past four quarters; 
the full impact on proﬁ t of a change 
in the price of oil therefore is felt only 
after a year).
Th e correlation between the two 
series is extremely tight.11 Th is statis-
tical fact points to the immense im-
portance that prices have come to play 
in the process of accumulation. In this 
particular chart, the tight correlation 
makes much of the media discussion 
and learned analyses of the oil arena 
redundant . 
In order to 
know the re-
ported diﬀ er-
ential proﬁ ts 
of the oil 
c o m p a n i e s 
a year from 
now, you 
don’t need to speculate about Peak 
Oil, about rising demand from China, 
or about the coming heat waves in 
Europe. Th is type of guesswork, al-
though interesting for other purposes, 
is unnecessary here. Th e only thing 
you need to know is the current price 
of oil. 
To illustrate: the oﬃ  cial data are 
not yet in, but we already know that, 
over the past 12 months, the price of 
oil averaged roughly US $65 in 2002 
prices. Th e correlation in the chart 
suggests that, a year from now, the 
reported global proﬁ t share of the oil 
companies will hover around 15 per-
cent. 
Now, let’s backtrack and examine 
the history presented in Figure . 
Th e data show that, during the oil cri-
sis of the 1970s and early 1980s, the 
cost of crude petroleum shot through 
the roof. In 1979 a barrel of oil cost 
over US $90 in today’s prices. Dur-
ing those happy stagﬂ ationary times, 
the oil companies pocketed nearly 20 
percent of all global proﬁ ts. But as 
diﬀ erential accumulation moved into 
breadth and mergers picked up, inﬂ a-
tion fell and oil prices dropped even 
faster. Th e oil companies’ global share 
Th e link 
between Middle 
East conﬂ icts 
and diﬀ erential 
proﬁ t is the 
price of oil
In order to predict 
the proﬁ ts of oil 
companies, all you 
need to know is the 
current price of oil
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of proﬁ t collapsed, reaching a mere 3 
percent by the end of Clinton’s presi-
dency.
Th e reversal came with the new 
millennium and the Bush presidency. 
With the 2001 invasion of Afghani-
stan, the Middle East entered a pro-
tracted period of war, oil prices have 
risen to US $65-75, and the share of 
the oil companies in global proﬁ t—al-
though not yet at historical highs—is 
moving higher and higher.
How big are the gains of the oil 
companies? During the ﬁ ve-year pe-
riod from August 2001 to July 2006, 
the average net income of the global 
oil sector amounted to US $108 bil-
lion per annum. Th is ﬁ gure compares 
with an annual proﬁ t of only US $34 
billion in the year from August 1999 
to July 2000—a jump of US $75 bil-
lion if we round the numbers.
How much did it cost to generate 
this jump in proﬁ ts? For argument’s 
sake, let’s assume that since 2000 the 
entire increase in the price of oil—and 
therefore the whole increase in oil 
proﬁ ts—was due to the new Energy 
Conﬂ icts in the Middle East. Assume 
further that so far the U.S. govern-
ment has spent on its Afghanistan-
Iraq operation 
the annual 
equivalent of 1 
percent of its 
GDP—rough-
ly US $100 
billion a year. 
Th ese as-
s u m p t i o n s , 
although sim-
plistic and in-
accurate, indi-
cate the overall magnitudes involved: 
the war costs US $100 billion a year 
and it generates an extra US $75 bil-
lion in annual oil proﬁ ts. In other 
words, for every additional US $1 the 
U.S. government spends on the wars, 
the owners of the oil companies earn 
an additional US ¢75 in net proﬁ t.
Clearly, such phenomenal cost-ben-
eﬁ t ratios can be generated only indi-
rectly. And that is perhaps one of the 
important features of the new wars: 
a fairly modest increase in military 
spending brings about massive chang-
es in prices and distribution—changes 
that go beyond the immediate arena 
of the conﬂ ict, and whose magnitude 
can match and even exceed the mili-
tary budget itself.
For every additional 
US $1 the U.S. 
government spends on 
the wars, the owners 
of the oil companies 
earn US ¢75 in
net proﬁ t
Economy of the Occupation22 |
A s noted earlier, the new wars came as the long breadth phase of diﬀ eren-
tial accumulation was winding down. 
Th e immediate beneﬁ ciaries were the 
arms contractors and the oil compa-
nies of the Weapondollar-Petrodol-
lar Coalition. But gradually, as global 
diﬀ erential accumulation shifted from 
breadth to depth, the gains spread to 
8. Sweet Inﬂ ation
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dominant capital as a whole.
Figure  vividly illustrates this 
process for the United States. Th e 
thin line in the graph plots the rate of 
inﬂ ation, measured as the annual rate 
of change of the consumer price index. 
Th e thick line is a ratio between prof-
its and wages. It measures the ratio of 
the earnings per share of the S&P 500 
(the largest publicly traded corpo-
rations listed in the United States, 
which could be taken as a proxy for 
dominant capital) to the hourly wage 
rate in manufacturing. 
Movements in this latter ratio in-
dicate redistribution. When the index 
rises, it means that the proﬁ ts of dom-
inant capital rise faster (or fall more 
slowly) than the wage rate. When the 
index falls it suggests an opposite pro-
cess—namely, that the proﬁ ts of dom-
inant capital fall faster (or rise more 
slowly) than wages. 
As the chart shows, in late 2000, 
inﬂ ation started falling, and in 2002 
it reached 1 percent—a postwar low. 
Th e decline was accompanied by a 
massive drop in the ratio of proﬁ t to 
wages, which fell by 55 percent from 
its 2000 peak. In the wake of these de-
velopments, the Federal Reserve Board 
C h a i r m a n , 
Alan Greens-
pan, warned of 
an ‘unwelcome 
substantial fall 
in inﬂ ation,’ and 
was encour-
aged by leading 
ﬁ nanciers to ‘go 
for higher in-
ﬂ ation.’12
Th ese deﬂ ationary warnings came 
in April 2003, after the U.S. had al-
ready invaded Iraq. Our own view at 
the time was rather diﬀ erent. In Janu-
ary 2003, just before the invasion, we 
wrote:
[…] if oil prices continue to rise, 
inﬂ ation will most likely follow, 
the spectre of deﬂ ation will be re-
moved and the large companies 
could sound a big sigh of relief. 
For these companies there would 
also be an icing on the cake. Inﬂ a-
tion usually works to redistribute 
income from labour to capital and 
from small ﬁ rms to larger ones. 
It will therefore make the leading 
companies better oﬀ  relatively, if 
not absolutely.13 
Alan 
Greenspan was 
encouraged 
by leading 
ﬁ nanciers to 
‘go for higher 
inﬂ ation’
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Wages do not 
rise—and 
sometimes 
even fall—in 
the midst of 
price inﬂ ation
And indeed, 
Greenspan didn’t 
have to work too 
hard. Th e new 
wars have done 
the job for him. 
Th e neo-conser-
vatives sent their 
army to the Mid-
dle East, the price 
of oil soared, and inﬂ ation—although 
hesitant at ﬁ rst—eventually started to 
follow. 
Th e distributional consequences 
weren’t lost on investors and workers. 
While wages remained ﬂ at, proﬁ ts—
particularly those earned by domi-
nant capital—surged. As a result, the 
ratio of proﬁ t to wages climbed rap-
idly—rising 250 percent since 2001 
and sending the overall share of proﬁ t 
in GDP to its highest level since data 
began to be collated in 1929. 
Th e huge distributional impact of a 
small increase in inﬂ ation is symptom-
atic of the new order. During the wel-
fare-warfare state, inﬂ ation usually in-
volved a wage-price spiral that worked 
to limit the diﬀ erential increases in 
proﬁ ts. For instance, a 4 percent in-
crease in prices typically would be ac-
companied by a rise in wages—say, of 
3 percent. As a result, the markup ra-
tio of sales to wages would increase by 
1 percent, generating a relatively mod-
est rise in proﬁ ts. Th e situation now is 
very diﬀ erent. Workers in the United 
Stares are locked in global competi-
tion with workers in China, India and 
other ‘emerging markets,’ which means 
that wages do not rise—and some-
times even fall—in the midst of price 
inﬂ ation. In this context, a 4 percent 
inﬂ ation translates to a 4 percent in-
crease in the markup and to a far larg-
er increase in proﬁ ts. 
All in all, then, the new wars are 
deﬁ nitely cheap. For a minimal cost, 
they stir up inﬂ ation and generate 
large increases in proﬁ ts. But cheap 
wars have another side to them. Th ey 
are hard to win. 
Submarine
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The idea of a mass,‘voluntary’ army was born out of the French Revo-
lution. Th e new soldiers turned out 
to be cheaper and more loyal than 
mercenaries, and they fought well. 
However, the masses needed to be 
educated so that they could read the 
newspapers and follow the propagan-
da—hence the birth of compulsory 
‘elementary’ schooling. Later on, the 
proles started to demand additional 
perks. Th ey wanted culture, insur-
ance, pensions and veteran beneﬁ ts. 
In the 1910s, the elites cheated them. 
Th ey sent the masses to be butch-
ered by the millions in the trenches 
of World War I, and then abandoned 
those who returned as veterans. Th is 
experience raised the ante. In the early 
1940s, the citizens-soldiers had to be 
oﬀ ered a whole welfare state, so that 
they would be willing to get butch-
ered, again, in the Second World War. 
What initially looked like ‘soldiers for 
free’ turned out to be a rather expen-
sive way of ﬁ ghting wars. 
Th e last ex-
pensive war 
was Vietnam. 
With neoliber-
al globalization 
replacing the 
w e l f a re - w a r-
fare state, there 
was no longer a 
need for mass armies with high over-
head. Instead, the capitalists started 
to invest in ‘smart weapons’ that could 
be operated by high-school dropouts 
and cause plenty of damage. Th ey 
abandoned the draft in favor of purely 
professional armies—partly govern-
mental, partly private.
A similar process has taken place 
in Israel. During the 1970s, in the 
hay days of the Israeli welfare-warfare 
state, military spending amounted to 
25 percent of GDP, the draft included 
most Jewish citizens (excluding the 
ultra-orthodox), and the government 
spent heavily on social services. 
But with the breadth regime of the 
late 1980s and 1990s, Israeli capital-
9. Cheap Wars
Th e 1970s were 
the hay days 
of the welfare-
warfare economy 
in Israel
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ists became decreasingly dependent 
on the war economy. Israel began 
its reconciliation with its neighbor-
ing Arab states, and the military was 
both reduced and transformed. Mili-
tary spending dropped to 6 percent 
of GDP, and many military activi-
ties were privatized. Th e duration of 
military service has been shortened, 
and fewer get drafted. In parallel, the 
welfare state has been progressively 
dismantled, with education, public 
health care and other social services 
consistently eroding. Hundreds of 
thousands of guest workers have been 
brought in, and the labor unions have 
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been reduced to token institutions. 
Th e consequences of this process 
are illustrated in Figure . Th e chart 
contrasts the average monthly wage 
rate with the Tel-Aviv stock price in-
dex (both expressed in constant prices 
and rebased for comparison purposes, 
with January 1980=100). 
Th e ﬁ gure shows that, until the 
early 1990s, the fortunes of workers 
and capitalists moved more or less in 
tandem. But with the onslaught of the 
breadth regime, their roads parted. 
During the 1990s and early 2000s, 
wages have hardly increased, while 
capital gains have risen to the strato-
sphere. 
Israeli reservists, who were called 
to ﬁ ght in the unfolding war, probably 
have not seen this graph, but the re-
ality behind it is certainly familiar to 
them. Th ey know about deteriorating 
social services, about job insecurity, 
about overly expensive housing, about 
the loss of open spaces. Th ey know 
that getting wounded in a war is a bad 
deal that yields meager compensation. 
Most importantly, they know that the 
elite that sends them to ﬁ ght doesn’t 
really care about them.
Th ese sentiments are quite explicit 
and appear regularly in the press. Th e 
following is a typical report of the dif-
ﬁ culties faced by reserve soldiers:
Defense Min-
ister Amir 
Peretz has re-
fused to use a 
law allowing 
IDF reserv-
ists called up 
for service re-
cently to en-
joy an exemp-
tion on ﬁ nes 
and interest 
associated with debts they incur 
during their call-up period. […] 
[Th e reservists] are furious after 
discovering they are still required 
to pay the ﬁ nes and interest even 
though they were unable to issue 
payments on time because they 
were called up. […] ‘Th e reservists 
are forgotten, the way they always 
forget us,’ said one of the [reserv-
ists organization’s] leaders, Alex 
Minkovsky. ‘We’re calling on the 
social-minded Defense Minister 
Amir Peretz to wake up and do 
something. We’re ﬂ ooded by inqui-
As the Israeli 
welfare state 
was dismantled, 
military service 
was shortened 
and fewer got 
drafted
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ries of reservists who are suﬀ ering 
crises on a daily basis.’14
D o m i n a n t 
capital has 
no such com-
plaints. As it 
turns out, a 
day before De-
fense Minister 
Peretz refused 
to heed the re-
servists’ plea, 
his govern-
ment priva-
tized the country’s oil reﬁ neries for 
US $800 million. In an interview, the 
winning bidder, Tzadik Bino, sounded 
almost embarrassed:
Th e state should not have privatized 
the reﬁ neries, and neither should it 
have privatized El-Al [the national 
airline], Bezeq [the national phone 
company] and Magen David Adom 
[the emergency medical service]. 
[…] Th e next stage would be to 
privatize the IDF. […] We are still 
ﬁ ghting for our existence, and it 
doesn’t pay to transfer strategic as-
sets to private hands.15 
Th e old warfare-welfare state was 
dominated by charismatic ﬁ gure 
heads, ‘leaders’ such as Churchill, de 
Gaulle and Ben Gurion who seemed 
removed from any ‘particular’ interests. 
By contrast, the neoliberal state tends 
to be populated by retainers—many 
of them corrupt and criminal—like 
Bush, Chirac, Berlusconi, Sharon, Ne-
tanyahu and Olmert, who don’t even 
try to hide their true loyalties. 
Th e capitalist elite, which is served 
by and sustains these politicians, no 
longer bears a clear national attach-
ment. Many of Israel’s largest com-
panies are owned by foreign investors 
and multinational companies. Simi-
larly, most of Israel’s large owners—
from the Recannatis, to Fishman to 
Khan—have become global investors. 
Israel for them is merely one of many 
assets in a diversiﬁ ed world portfolio. 
Unlike during the 1970s, when they 
had all their eggs in the same Israeli 
basket, now they don’t need to worry 
too much about what happens in the 
country. Th eir local holdings represent 
only a fraction of their investments, 
and they are highly vendible.
A recent quote from the ﬁ nancial 
A day before 
Peretz refused the 
reservists’ plea, 
Israeli privatized 
the state’s oil 
reﬁ neries for US 
$800 million
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section of the daily Ha’aretz, written 
in the midst of the ﬁ ghting in Leba-
non and Gaza, indicates the extent to 
which foreign asset diversiﬁ cation has 
been accepted as natural by ‘ordinary’ 
investors: 
Over and above the ‘regular’ risks 
of emerging markets such as Chi-
na, Brazil or Russia, Israel has 
a continuous security risk. […] 
Th is risk cannot be ignored even 
in peace time. Th e global diver-
siﬁ cation of investment therefore 
is not a privilege. It is a necessity. 
[…] It means that, in the inter-
est of reducing risk, Israeli inves-
tors have to permanently allocate 
a ﬁ xed proportion of their assets 
to investment overseas. How much 
is ‘enough’? Until recently, the con-
vention was 25%, but perhaps the 
share of foreign assets should be 
raised to 50%. Our bodies have to 
stay here. But why should our sav-
ings suﬀ er the same fate?16 
Under these cir-
cumstances, it 
is little wonder 
that the Israeli 
‘war machine’ 
has lost much 
of its military 
edge. Th e incen-
tive to ﬁ ght for “one’s country” when 
that country is so socially fractured 
is much reduced—particularly when 
confronted with socially embedded 
and highly motivated religious mili-
tias. 
And so the cheap wars linger, death 
and destruction mount, and the prof-
its continue to accumulate. 
Th e Israeli 
capitalist elite 
no longer bears 
a clear national 
attachment
Cruise Missile
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1.) Not all radical thinkers share this view. Some argue, to the contrary, that war 
and militarization, although embedded in and often caused by the capitalist reality, 
are harmful to capitalism and undermine its vitality. 
2.) United States, National Security Council, NSC 68: United States Objectives 
and Programs for National Security. A Report to the President Pursuant to the Presi-
dent’s Directive of January 31, 1950. Top Secret. Washington DC, 1950 (http://geo-
bay.com/62d3c0).
3.) A logarithmic scale has the eﬀ ect of amplifying the size on the chart of 
smaller values and compressing the size of larger ones. Th is transformation is useful 
when there are very big jumps in the data – such as during the 1940s – jumps that 
would otherwise make the variations of smaller values look too miniscule to discern 
on the chart.
4.) Data on the ratio of foreign assets to GDP are from Maurice Obstfeld and 
Alan M. Taylor, Global Capital Markets: Integration, Crisis and Growth (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2004), pp. 52-53, Table 2-1.
5.) Th ese issues are articulated in Jonathan Nitzan and Shimshon Bichler, 
‘Dominant Capital and the New Wars,’ Journal of World Systems Research, 2004, Vol. 
10, No. 2, pp. 255-327 (http://bnarchives.yorku.ca/1/). 
6.) Due to mergers, the data in Figure  pertain to British Petroleum until 
1997 and to BP-Amoco since 1998; to Chevron and Texaco until 1999 and to Chev-
ron-Texaco since 2000; to Exxon and Mobil until 1998 and to ExxonMobil from 
1999; and to Royal-Dutch/Shell throughout.
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7.) Th e conﬂ icts include the 1967 Arab-Israeli conﬂ ict; the 1973 Arab-Is-
raeli conﬂ ict; the 1979 Israeli invasion of Lebanon; the 1979 Iranian Revo-
lution; the 1979 Soviet invasion of Afghanistan; the 1980 beginning of the 
Iraq-Iran War; the 1990/1 ﬁ rst Gulf War; the 2000 beginning of the sec-
ond Intifada; the 2001 Coalition invasion of Afghanistan; and the 2003 Co-
alition invasion of Iraq (whose publicized preparation began in 2002).
8.) Although there was no ‘oﬃ  cial’ conﬂ ict in 1996-7, there was plenty of vio-
lence, including an Iraqi invasion of Kurdish areas and U.S. cruise missile attacks.
9.) In 2003, as the Iraq war unfolded, we wrote the following text: 
Our own view is that Middle East conﬂ icts were integral to the power process-
es of global accumulation. […] In the process, [the Weapondollar-Petrodollar] 
coalition had become increasingly fused with its ‘parent’ governments on the 
one hand and its OPEC ‘hosts’ on the other, leading to a growing ‘capital-state 
symbiosis’ between them. Whether or not there was ‘conspiracy’ here, and what 
the precise nature of such a ‘conspiracy’ was, remains an open question. Unfor-
tunately, these types of issues are not the usual staple of primetime television. 
Occasionally, however, the truth does come to light, albeit with a little delay. 
[…] Perhaps in due course someone will publish the secret ‘Exxon Papers’ or 
a declassiﬁ ed ‘NSC Report on Energy and War in the Middle East,’ thereby 
opening a window into the backroom story of Energy Conﬂ icts in the region 
(‘Dominant Capital and the New Wars,’ Journal of World Systems Research, 
2004, Vol. 10, No. 2, p. 313, http://bnarchives.yorku.ca/1/). 
As it turned out, the relevant documents surfaced rather quickly. Less than a year 
after the publication of our paper, Greg Palast uncovered the existence of two secret 
– and rather diﬀ erent – plans for the future of Iraq’s oil. Th e 2003 U.S. invasion of 
Iraq, Palast argued, reﬂ ected the conﬂ icting strategies of two opposing factions. Th e 
ﬁ rst, vocal faction, led by the neo-cons and the Pentagon, planned to privatize Iraqi 
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oil, ﬂ ood the market and undermine OPEC. Th e other faction, led by the large oil 
companies and elements within the State Department, shared none of these fantasies. 
It let the neo-cons ﬁ nish the job of conquering Iraq, and then sent its representatives 
to take control of the country’s oil production. In the end, there was no privatiza-
tion, no ﬂ ooding of the market and no undermining of OPEC – an organization of 
which the United States, as the ruler of Iraq, was now a de-facto member. See Greg 
Palast, ‘Secret US Plans for Iraq’s Oil,’ BBC News, March 17, 2005 (http://geobay.
com/11c057); Greg Palast, Armed Madhouse (New York: Dutton, 2006).
10.) Jonathan Nitzan and Shimshon Bichler, ‘New Imperialism or New Capital-
ism?’ Review, 2006, Vol. XXIX, No. 1, pp. 1-86 (http://bnarchives.yorku.ca/203/). 
11.) Th e correlation coeﬃ  cient between the two monthly series measures 0.80 
(out of 1) for the period since January 1974, and 0.92 for the period since January 
1979.
12.) Alan Greenspan, ‘Testimony of Chairman Alan Greenspan Before the Joint 
Economic Committee,’ U.S. Congress, May 6, 2003; Bill Dudley and Paul McCulley, 
‘Greenspan Must Go For Higher Inﬂ ation,’ Financial Times, April 23, 2003, pp. 17.
13.) Jonathan Nitzan and Shimshon Bichler, ‘It’s All About Oil,’ News From 
Within, Vol. XIX, No. 1, January 2003, p. 11 (http://bnarchives.yorku.ca/38/). 
14.) Tani Goldstein, ‘Reservists Want Peretz to Okay Perks,’ Ynet, August 1, 
2006 (http://geobay.com/4d849e). 
15.) Tani Goldstein, ‘Bino to Ynet: “Th ere Was No Need to Privatize the Reﬁ ner-
ies,’ Hebrew, Ynet, August 1, 2006 (http://geobay.com/93e47c). 
16.) Ami Ginsburg, ‘What Did We Learn From the First Two Weeks of the Sec-
ond Lebanon War?’ Hebrew, Ha’aretz, July 28, 2006 (http://geobay.com/934570).
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News from Within is a monthly magazine published by the Alternative Information Center which 
refl ects the center’s combination of political activism with research and analysis.
News from Within presents a critical discussion of the political realities which have resulted from the 
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Subscribe to The Economy of the Occupation or order individual bulletins
Th e Economy of the Occupation, published monthly by the Alternative 
Information Center (AIC), oﬀ ers a new approach to the economic situation 
in the Occupied Palestinian Territories (OPT) and Israel. Th is bulletin 
will provide accessible and singular analyses of the socioeconomic interests 
behind the Israeli occupation of Palestine.
At the present time, the majorities amongst the otherwise politicized 
Palestinian and Israeli populations possess a limited understanding of 
their own socioeconomic situation. Available publications are sporadic, 
insuﬃ  cient, often biased and fail to consistently link society, politics and 
the economy in the OPT and Israel. Th is disempowering state of aﬀ airs 
makes it all the more critical to oﬀ er alternative readings of the economic 
reality of the occupation.
Th e publication touches on various issues such as inﬂ ation, debt, trade, 
employment, poverty and capital, and demonstrates the inﬂ uence of these 
issues on the daily lives of Palestinians and Israelis. Th e aim is to enhance 
awareness and to contribute to a more informed struggle for social justice 
and a just peace for Palestinians and Israelis.
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Jonathan Nitzan teaches political economy at York University in Toronto. 
Shimshon Bichler teaches political economy at colleges and universities in 
Israel. Most of their publications are freely available from Th e Bichler & 
Nitzan Archives (http://bnarchives.net). 
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